How Keyvane protects your vault
Plain words first, the specification second. Everything here is implemented identically in the app and the browser extension, and checked against shared test vectors.
Summary
- Your master password never leaves your devices. Your Secret Key is never sent to us or to your storage; on Apple devices it is also kept in your end-to-end encrypted iCloud Keychain.
- The vault is encrypted on your device with XChaCha20-Poly1305 before it is saved anywhere.
- Keys are derived with Argon2id from your password and a 160-bit random Secret Key, so a stolen file cannot be brute-forced.
- TechHigh runs no server that receives your vault. Your storage provider only ever receives an encrypted file.
- Nobody can recover a vault without the password and the Secret Key. That includes us.
The three secrets
| Secret | Size | Where it lives |
|---|---|---|
| Master password | Your choice | Only in your head (and, optionally, handwritten on your Emergency Kit). |
| Secret Key | 20 random bytes (160 bits) | Your device's keychain, the printed Emergency Kit and, on Apple devices, your iCloud Keychain (end-to-end encrypted by Apple). On Android and Windows a new device gets it from the Emergency Kit, by scanning its QR code or typing it. Never in the vault file, never sent to us or to your storage. |
| Vault key | 32 random bytes | Inside the vault file, wrapped by the master key. Optionally in the device keychain behind biometrics for quick unlock. |
The Secret Key is shown as KV1- followed by 32 Base32 characters in eight groups of four, for example KV1-ABCD-EFGH-IJKL-MNOP-QRST-UVWX-YZ23-4567.
Cryptography
| Purpose | Algorithm |
|---|---|
| Key derivation | Argon2id, 32-byte output |
| Encryption | XChaCha20-Poly1305 (24-byte random nonce, 16-byte tag) |
| Randomness | Operating-system CSPRNG |
| 2FA codes | TOTP, RFC 6238 (HMAC-SHA1/256/512), default 6 digits / 30 s |
Key derivation
input = UTF-8(password) || 0x00 || secretKeyBytes
masterKey = Argon2id(input, salt = 16 random bytes, m, t, p, len = 32)
Default parameters are stored in the file so they can be raised later: 64 MiB memory, 3 passes, 1 lane on native platforms; 19 MiB, 2 passes on the web. Because the Secret Key adds 160 bits of entropy, a stolen vault file cannot be brute-forced even if the master password is weak.
Wrapping and payload
vaultKey = 32 random bytes (created once per vault)
wrappedKey = XChaCha20-Poly1305(vaultKey, key = masterKey, aad = "keyvane:v1:key:<vaultId>")
payload = XChaCha20-Poly1305(JSON(VaultData), key = vaultKey, aad = "keyvane:v1:data:<vaultId>")
The additional authenticated data binds each box to its vault, so boxes cannot be swapped between vaults. Changing the master password creates a new salt and master key and re-wraps the vault key; items are untouched. Biometric unlock stores the raw vault key in the OS keychain and releases it only after a successful biometric prompt; the master password is still required every 14 days.
Vault file format
A vault is one .kvault file: UTF-8 JSON on the outside, encrypted inside. Without the keys, the only readable fields are the format name, version, vault id, KDF parameters and salt, revision number and save time. Client names, item titles, URLs, field labels and values, notes, tags, attachments and 2FA secrets are all inside the encrypted payload.
{
"format": "keyvane.vault", "v": 1, "id": "<uuid>",
"kdf": { "alg": "argon2id", "m": 65536, "t": 3, "p": 1, "salt": "<base64>" },
"key": { "n": "<base64 nonce>", "c": "<base64 ciphertext+tag>" },
"data": { "n": "<base64 nonce>", "c": "<base64 ciphertext+tag>" },
"rev": 12, "saved": 1730000000000
}
Sync merges by record: a record on one side only is kept; the newer version of the same record wins and the older one goes into that item's history, so nothing is lost. Uploads use the provider's revision tag, so a newer remote file is merged, never overwritten.
The iCloud Keychain trade-off
On iPhone, iPad and Mac, Keyvane also saves your Secret Key in your iCloud Keychain, which Apple end-to-end encrypts. That is why a new Apple device only asks for your master password. It is a convenience with a real cost, and we want you to know exactly what it is:
- Someone who gets your vault file and gets into your iCloud Keychain (your Apple ID plus a trusted device or its passcode) holds your Secret Key. Between them and your vault there is then only your master password and Argon2id — the same protection as a password-only design.
- Everyone else, including your storage provider, anyone who steals the vault file on its own, and TechHigh, still faces the full 160-bit Secret Key.
- So on Apple devices, a strong master password and a well-protected Apple account (two-factor authentication, a strong device passcode) matter more. Keyvane has no separate switch for this; if iCloud Keychain is turned off in your Apple account settings, the Secret Key is kept only on the device and on your Emergency Kit.
Autofill and sharing a login
- Autofill uses a separate encrypted index of logins (and, on Android 14 and later, passkeys) that stays on the device and is unlocked with biometrics or the device passcode, so the system autofill service can work without the full vault being open. On Android, Keyvane is an Autofill service and works with Credential Manager to fill and save; on iOS and macOS it is an AutoFill credential provider that fills logins and, on iOS 26.2 and later, can also save new ones; on Mac, new passwords are added in the app.
- Sharing a login sends its username, password and website as plain text to the share sheet or clipboard, after a biometric check. From that point it is outside Keyvane's encryption and is as private as the app or person you shared it with.
- Keyvane does not offer shared vaults today. Team sharing is planned and will be described here, with its own threat model, before it ships.
Threat model
What Keyvane protects against
- A stolen or leaked vault file — from a cloud breach, a lost laptop backup or a shared drive. Without the password and Secret Key the file is unreadable, and the Secret Key makes guessing infeasible.
- A curious or compromised storage provider, whichever you choose. Providers see an encrypted file, its size and timestamps, nothing more.
- A compromised TechHigh. TechHigh never holds your vault, your master password or your Secret Key, so there is nothing of yours on our side to leak.
- Tampering with files — authenticated encryption detects any change.
Honest limits
Encryption protects people who have no key. It cannot protect you from things that happen on an unlocked device, or from people you chose to trust. Specifically:
- On Apple devices, your iCloud Keychain holds your Secret Key. Anyone who has both your vault file and access to your iCloud Keychain only needs to guess your master password. See the trade-off.
- Anything you share leaves the encryption. A login shared through the share sheet or clipboard is plain text in whatever app receives it.
- Autofill fills what you approve. It matches logins to apps and websites, but you should still check you are on the right site before filling.
- The breach check reveals a hash prefix. Only the first 5 characters of each password's SHA-1 hash are sent to Have I Been Pwned (k-anonymity, with padding), and only when you run the check.
- Malware on an unlocked device can read what you can read. Keyvane limits the window with auto-lock, clipboard clearing and screenshot blocking, but no password manager can defend an owned device.
- Lose both your password and your Emergency Kit and nobody can recover your vault. This is a deliberate property, not a missing feature.
On your device
- Biometric quick unlock, with a master password re-check every 14 days.
- Auto-lock after inactivity; clipboard cleared automatically after copying.
- Screenshot blocking on platforms that support it.
- Atomic saves with a local backup copy, so an interrupted write cannot corrupt the vault.
- Key derivation runs in the background so a slow Argon2id never blocks the UI into weaker parameters.
- Emergency Kit PDF generated at sign-up for printing.
- The web app runs under a strict Content Security Policy and uses lighter Argon2id parameters; it is intended for emergency access rather than daily use.
Responsible disclosure
If you believe you have found a security problem in the Keyvane apps, the browser extension or this website, please tell us privately first.
- Email security@techhigh.co.uk. Include steps to reproduce, affected versions and, if you have one, a proof of concept.
- Machine-readable contact details are published at
/.well-known/security.txt(RFC 9116). - We aim to acknowledge reports within 3 working days and to keep you informed as we fix the issue.
- Please give us reasonable time to fix before publishing, do not access or modify data that is not yours, and do not run tests that could affect other people's accounts or storage.
- We will not take legal action against researchers who act in good faith and follow these guidelines, and we are happy to credit you when the fix ships if you wish.
An external security audit of the core library and the extension is planned before public launch. This page will link to the report.
Full specification: the vault format and crypto specification (v1) in the Keyvane repository. This page is a summary and the specification takes precedence where they differ.